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Abstract
This paper shows experimentally that hearing expert opinions can be a double-edged
sword for collective decision making. We present a majoritarian voting game of com-
mon interest where committee members receive not only private information, but
also expert information that is more accurate than private information and observed
by all members. In theory, there are Bayesian Nash equilibria where the committee
members’ voting strategy incorporates both types of information and access to ex-
pert information enhances the efficiency of the majority decision. However, in the
laboratory, expert information had excessive influence on the voting behaviour and
prevented efficient aggregation of individual information. We find a large efficiency
loss due to the presence of expert information especially when the committee size
is large. Using an incentivized questionnaire, we find that many subjects severely
underestimate the efficiency gain from information aggregation and they follow ex-
pert information much more frequently than efficiency requires. This suggests that
those who understand the efficiency gain from information aggregation and perceive
the game correctly might nonetheless be “stuck” in an inefficient outcome.
Keywords: committee decision making, voting experiment, expert information, strategic
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1 Introduction
When collective decisions are made through voting, typically each voter has not only
private information known solely to themselves but also public information observed by
all voters. Examples of commonly held information in collective decision making include
“expert” opinions solicited by a committee, shared knowledge in a board meeting that has
emerged from pre-voting deliberation, and evidence presented to a jury. Such information
may well be superior to the private information each individual voter has, and if so, it
would be natural to expect that their votes should take the public information into account
at least to some extent.
Meanwhile, such public information is rarely perfect, and in particular expert opinions
are often alleged to have excessive influence on decision making. For example, in recent
years the IMF’s advice to the governments of some highly indebted countries have heavily
influenced their parliamentary and cabinet decisions for austerity. However, the IMF’s
expertise has been questioned by specialists in monetary policy, and it has been reported
that the IMF itself has admitted that they may have underestimated the impact of their
austerity measure in Greece.1 Financial deregulations in the 1990s seem to have been
prompted by endorsements from financial experts at the time, but some politicians reflect
that in retrospect they may have followed expert opinions too naively.2 Indeed, the role
of experts in political decisions was one of widely discussed topics in debates on the UK’s
withdrawal from the EU, where a vast majority of “experts” on political, economic, and
social issues warned against leaving the EU.3 In the legal profession, how information
from an “expert witness” should be presented in trials is an important topic, so that the
judges and juries can process the information appropriately when making their decisions
(Federal Judicial Center, 2011). The recognition that expert opinions can be overly in-
fluential in collective decision making is not a recent one. In the Athenian Democracy
of Ancient Greece, any citizen could be expelled from the city state for ten years if he
was considered to be excessively influential on democratic choice and thus posing a risk
for a potential transition to tyranny.45 How would collective decision making through
voting be influenced by shared information? If commonly observed expert information is
better than the information each voter has, would the presence of such expert information
improve the quality of the collective decision? Can expert information have “too much”
1“IMF ’to admit mistakes’ in handling Greek debt crisis and bailout”, Guardian, 4 June 2013, http:
//www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/jun/05/imf-admit-mistakes-greek-crisis-austerity
2“Gordon Brown admits ’big mistake’ over banking crisis”, BBC News, 13 March 2013, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/business-13032013
3“Who are ’experts’ anyway?”, Guardian, 12 November 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/
science/political-science/2016/nov/12/who-are-experts-anyway
4Several citizens were banned from the Ancient Athenian Democracy for this reason, including
Aristides the Just, one of the most well-known Athenian citizens for his intelligence and objectivity
(hence the name Just, see “Aristeides” in Plutarch’s Lives, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/
plutarch-plutarchs-lives-dryden-trans-vol-2#lf1014-02_head_016).
5This procedure is called ostracism, since the names of the over-influencing experts was written by
voters behind pottery shards (ostraka) for the ballot (see Kagan, 1961for a detailed description).
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influence? If so, why?
This paper addresses these questions experimentally, by introducing a public signal
into an otherwise classical Condorcet jury setup with majority rule. The public signal is
observed by all voters, and when it has superior accuracy to each voter’s private signal, we
call it “expert” information. We find that expert information had excessive influence on
voting behaviour, which may lead to inefficiency. Moreover, we argue that the excessive
influence of expert information stemmed largely from failure to appreciate the efficiency
gain from aggregation of private information, which was observed for a majority of the
voters. Those who did understand the benefit of information aggregation were nonetheless
“stuck” in the inefficient outcome, because as minority voters they had no or very little
influence over the majority decisions.6
Before reporting on the experiment we first present a majoritarian voting game with
expert information and identify two symmetric strategy equilibria of interest, namely
i) the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between
following the private and expert signals should they disagree; and ii) the “obedient”
equilibrium where all committee members and hence the committee decision always follow
the expert signal.7 We note that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the expert signal is
collectively taken into account in such a way that it maximizes the efficiency (accuracy)
of the committee decision among all symmetric strategy profiles. The Condorcet jury
theorem (CJT) holds a fortiori so that as the size of the committee becomes larger the
probability that the decision is correct increases and converges to 1. However, in the
obedient equilibrium, private information is not reflected in the committee decision and
its efficiency is identical to that of expert information, which may well be lower than
the efficiency the committee could achieve in the absence of expert information. In other
words, the introduction of expert information might reduce efficiency, depending on which
equilibrium is played.
Motivated by the possibility that expert information can enhance or diminish the effi-
ciency of equilibrium committee decisions, we conducted a laboratory experiment to study
the effect of expert information on voting behaviour and majority decisions. Of particu-
lar interest is whether the subjects can incorporate expert information into their voting
behaviour efficiently not least because doing so requires complex statistical and strategic
calculations as well as coordination across voters. Specifically, we set the accuracies of
the signals in such a way that the expert signal is more accurate than each voter’s private
signal but less accurate than what the aggregation of the private signals can achieve by
informative voting without the expert signal. Such parameter values seem plausible in
that the expert opinion should be taken into account but should not be decisive on its
6As we will discuss later in Section 2, a public signal can also be thought of as shared information
emerged through pre-voting deliberation.
7While the voters may ignore their private information completely, they cannot ignore the expert
information completely in equilibrium. That is, voting according only to their private signal is never an
equilibrium, since if a voter knows that all the others will follow their private signals, he deviates and
follows the expert signal.
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own. We had seven-person committees and fifteen-person committees, the latter of which
entail a larger potential efficiency loss from the obedient outcome because more private
information can be wasted by obedient voting in a larger committee.
In the experiment we find that the voters follow the expert signal much more frequently
than they should in the efficient mixed strategy equilibrium. Specifically, the majority
decisions follow the expert signal most of the time, as is consistent with the obedient
equilibrium.
Along with the treatments with both private and expert information, we ran treat-
ments where each voter received a private signal only, in order to compare the observed
efficiency of the committee decisions with and without expert information. For seven-
person committees the difference in efficiency between the two treatments is insignificant,
largely due to some non-equilibrium behaviour (i.e., voting against private information)
in the control treatment with private signals only, which reduces the benchmark efficiency.
However, despite some inefficient non-equilibrium voting, the fifteen-person committees
without expert information perform much better than those with expert information and
the difference in efficiency is significant. This suggests that expert information may indeed
be harmful for a larger committee.
In order to further investigate the source(s) of over-reliance on public information, we
also ran the treatments where i) public information is less accurate than private informa-
tion; and where ii) public information is presented as a common biased prior rather than
an additional piece of information on top of a uniform prior. When the public informa-
tion is less accurate the subjects follow their private information most of the time, which
indicates that the over-reliance on public information is due to its superior accuracy. We
also find that when public information that has superior accuracy is presented as a com-
mon biased prior and therefore less salient on screen when the subjects make decisions,
obedient voting is also less pronounced. However, voting according to the biased prior
(against the private signal when they disagreed) is still frequent enough relative to the
prediction from the efficient equilibrium that the majority decisions follow the biased prior
very often.
Furthermore, using an incentivized questionnaire, we examine subjects’ understanding
of the power of information aggregation through majority rule in the absence of any
strategic concerns.8 The answers to the questionnaire reveal that more than a majority
of the subjects severely underestimate the efficiency gain from information aggregation.
Moreover, those who give correct answers vote according to public information more
often when the public information and private information disagree. This suggests that,
from the viewpoint of a social planner who decides whether to and how to provide a
committee with expert information, creating an equilibrium with higher efficiency does
8Specifically each subject chose how “the computer will vote” on all voters’ behalf, namely whether
the computer will vote according to the private signals all voters will receive, (in which case the decision
coincides with the majority of the private signals); or the public signal only, (in which case the decision
coincides with the public signal).
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not necessarily mean it is played.
In their seminal paper Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) first introduced game-theoretic
equilibrium analysis to the Condorcet jury with independent private signals. They demon-
strated that voting according to the private signal is not generally consistent with equi-
librium behaviour. McLennan (1998) and Wit (1998) studied symmetric mixed strategy
equilibria in the model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and showed that the CJT
holds in equilibrium for majority and super-majority rules (except for unanimity rule).
The analysis of the model was further extended by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
for different voting rules.9 The experimental study on strategic voting was pioneered
by Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) who tested the theoretical predictions from Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), and found that the subjects’
behaviour was largely consistent with the theory.10 Focusing on unanimity rule, Ali et al.
(2008) found that the findings by Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) are fairly robust to voting
protocols such as the number of repetitions and timing of voting (simultaneous or se-
quential). The present paper focuses on majority rule, but examines the effect of public
information on voting behaviour and outcomes.
Battaglini et al. (2010) and Morton and Tyran (2011) report results from experiments
where voters are asymmetrically informed, to study how the quality of the private signal
affects their decision to abstain, in the spirit of the model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996).11 The quality of the information each voter has in our framework also varies
according to whether the private and expert signals agree, in which case they provide
strong information about the state; or they disagree, in which case the uncertainty about
the state becomes relatively high. However, we do not allow voters to abstain, and more
importantly our primary interest is in the combination of private and public information,
which is fundamentally different from private information with different accuracy levels
with respect to the effect on the voters’ strategic choice, since the public signal represents
a perfectly correlated component of the information each voter has.
While we focus on simultaneous move voting games, the inclination to ignore private
information in favour of expert information is reminiscent of rational herding in sequential
decisions.12 Hung and Plott (2001) conducted a laboratory experiment on sequential
voting with majority rule. They found that some herding indeed occurs, resulting in
9For the same information structure as ours, Liu (2016) proposes a voting procedure that leads to an
equilibrium where all agents vote according to their private signal, regardless of the quality of the public
information/common prior.
10See Palfrey (2009) for an overview of the voting experiment literature. There is some recent laboratory
evidence of non-strategic sincere voting (Bouton et al. (2016); Bhattacharya et al., 2015) in different setups
from ours.
11Bhattacharya et al. (2014) study a related experimental setup but with costly voting.
12In the early rational herding literature (e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch,
1992) each player’s payoff is assumed to be determined only by his decision but not by others. Dekel and
Piccione (2000) and Ali and Kartik (2012) are among the papers that theoretically study sequential voting
in collective decision making where payoffs are intrinsically interdependent. Unlike the expert signal in
our setup, which is exogenously given to all voters, public information in their models is generated
endogenously by the observed choices of earlier voters.
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inefficiency compared to informative voting.
Bouton et al. (2016a) report on a voting experiment that involved multiple non-trivial
equilibria, although their main focus is on voting rules. In contrast with Bouton et al.
(2016b), where a lack of aggregate uncertainty is the main driving force behind voters’
coordination on one candidate, in our experiment it is high quality public information
that leads to significant reduction in welfare.
The role of public information and its welfare implications have been studied especially
in the context of coordination games (e.g. Morris and Shin, 2002; Angeletos and Pavan,
2004 and more recently Loeper et al., 2014). While theoretical models in that literature
point to the possibility that more accurate public information may reduce welfare, our
simple voting game (as in most other jury models) does not feature strategic complemen-
tarities, which means there is no direct payoff from taking the same action since the voters
are concerned only with whether the committee decision is right or wrong. Therefore the
mechanism through which public information has any effect on players’ choice and be-
lief is very different from that in coordination games. Cornand and Heinemann (2014)
conducted a laboratory experiment based on the coordination game of Morris and Shin
(2002) and found that subjects put less weight on public information in their choice, com-
pared to their unique equilibrium prediction. Cognitive biases in processing public and
private information for such coordination games have been explored by Trevino (2016).13
In our experiment, we find that subjects put more weight on public information relative
to the prediction from the efficient equilibrium, most probably by severely underestimat-
ing aggregation of private information. A related type of bounded rationality in voting
games was also observed by Esponda and Vespa (2014) who suggest that experimental
subjects face obstacles in carrying out simple pivotal calculations, despite feedback, hints,
and experience.14
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our model,
and its equilibria are derived in Section 2. Section 3 presents the experimental design,
and Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Equilibrium Predictions
Consider a committee that consists of an odd number of agents i ∈ N = {1, 2, .., n}. Each
agent simultaneously casts a costless binary vote, denoted by xi = {A,B}, for a collective
decision y ∈ Y = {A,B}. The committee decision is determined by majority rule. The
binary state of the world is denoted by s ∈ S = {A,B}, where both events are ex ante
13Duffy et al. (2016) study subjects’ choice in an individual decision making problem between private
information and social (public) information, the latter of which is the subjects’ past actions given private
information in the previous period.
14Levy and Razin (2015) develop a voting model where voters underestimate the correlation between
their own private signals (“correlation neglect”), and show that this cognitive bias may lead to better
information aggregation.
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equally likely Pr[s = A] = Pr[s = B] = 1/2. The members have identical preferences
ui : Y × S → R and the payoffs are normalized to 0 or 1. Specifically we denote the
vNM payoff by ui(y, s) and assume ui(A,A) = ui(B,B) = 1 and ui(A,B) = ui(B,A) = 0,
∀i ∈ N . This implies that the agents would like the decision to be matched with the
state.
Before voting, each agent receives two signals. One is a private signal about the state
σi ∈ K = {A,B}, for which the probability of the signal and the state being matched is
given by Pr[σi = A | s = A] = Pr[σi = B | s = B] = p, where p ∈ (1/2, 1]. We also have
Pr[σi = A | s = B] = Pr[σi = B | s = A] = 1− p.
In addition to the private signal, all agents in the committee observe a common public
signal σE ∈ L = {A,B}. Specifically, we assume Pr[σE = A | s = A] = Pr[σE = B |
s = B] = q and Pr[σE = A | s = B] = Pr[σE = B | s = A] = 1 − q, where q ∈ (1/2, 1].
Thus the model has n private signals and one public signal, and they are all assumed to
be independently distributed. The agents do not communicate before they vote.15
The public signal in our model has natural interpretations. When q > p, the public
signal can be thought of as expert information presented to the entire committee as in, e.g.
congressional hearings. Briefing materials presented to and shared among all committee
members would also have the same feature. Alternatively, it may capture shared knowl-
edge as a result of pre-voting deliberation. In that case, the private signal represents any
remaining uncommunicated information held by each agent, which is individually inferior
to shared information.16 Note that in the absence of the public signal, there exists an in-
formative voting equilibrium such that xi = σi for any i and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
holds (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996), so that as the number of agents becomes larger,
the probability that the majority decision matches the state converges to 1.
Let vi : K × L → [0, 1] denote the probability of an agent voting for the state his
private signal σi ∈ K = {A,B} indicates, given the private signal and the public signal
σE ∈ L = {A,B}. For example, vi(A,B) is the probability that agent i votes for A given
that his private signal is A and the public signal is B.
In what follows we consider equilibria in which voting behaviour and the outcome
depend on the signals the agents observe. Specifically, we focus on how agents vote
15The literature on deliberation in voting has studied public information endogenously generated by
voters sharing their otherwise private information through pre-voting deliberation (e.g., Coughlan, 2000;
Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2005; and Gerardi and Yariv, 2007). In these models, once a voter reveals
his private information credibly, he has no private information. Goeree and Yariv (2011) find in a
laboratory experiment that deliberation diminishes differences in voting behaviour across different voting
rules. However, Fehrler and Hughes (2015) find that in the presence of reputational issues agents tend
to misreport their private signals and therefore enhanced transparency may actually hinder information
aggregation.
16Suppose that every agent receives two independent signals σ(1)i and σ
(2)
i with accuracy p(1) and
p(2), respectively, but there is no public signal ex ante. Assume also that due to time, cognitive or
institutional constraints, only the first piece of information (σ(1)i ) can be shared through deliberation in
the committee before voting. If {σ(1)1 , σ(1)2 , ..., σ(1)n } are revealed to all agents, they collectively determine
the accuracy of public information q, while the accuracy of remaining private information for each agent
{σ(2)1 , σ(2)2 , ..., σ(2)n } is that of the second signal.
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depending on whether their private and public signals agree or disagree, i.e., vi(A,A) =
vi(B,B) and vi(A,B) = vi(B,A) for any i. Since the signals are symmetric, the labelling
of the state is assumed irrelevant, in line with the feature that the payoffs depend only
on whether the decision matches the state.
2.1 Equilibria
Let us focus our attention to symmetric strategy equilibria, where vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) ≡ α
and vi(B,A) = vi(A,B) ≡ β for any i. Note that because of the symmetry of the model
with respect to A and B, we can consider the cases of σE = A and σE = B as two
independent and essentially identical games, where only the labelling differs. We start by
observing that expert information cannot be ignored in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If q > p, every agent voting with probability one for their own private
signal is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If q ≤ p, voting with probability one for their
own private signal is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proposition has a straightforward intuition. Suppose that an agent is pivotal and
his private signal and the public signal disagree. In that event, the posterior of the agent
is such that the votes from the other agents, who vote according to their private signal, are
collectively uninformative, since there are equal numbers of the votes for A and B. Given
this, the agent compares the two signals when they disagree and chooses to follow the one
with higher accuracy. If q > p, such voting behaviour breaks the putative equilibrium in
which every agent votes according to their private signal.
In contrast, there is an equilibrium where every agent follows the public signal.
Proposition 2. There exists a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium where every agent
votes with probability one for the public signal. If q ≥ p the equilibrium is trembling hand
perfect.
Proof. Consider agent i. If all the other agents vote according to the public signal, he
is indifferent to which alternative to vote for, and thus every agent voting for the public
signal is an equilibrium. See Appendix A for trembling hand perfection.
The majority decision in this equilibrium follows the public signal with probability 1,
and we call it the obedient equilibrium. While the equilibrium is trivial from the strategic
perspective and the obedient strategy is weakly dominated, it is “robust” to perturbations
if the public signal is more accurate than the private signal. Indeed, if the probability
distribution of trembles is the same whether the signals agree or disagree, even if there
is a non-degenerate pivot probability, being pivotal by itself is completely uninformative
about the state, and thus he would consider the two signals at hand (public and private)
only and if they disagree, he follows the public signal for higher accuracy. This also
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implies that obedient voting in equilibrium does not necessarily require that an agent
should never be pivotal.
However, if trembles have different distributions depending on the signal realization,
then being pivotal becomes informative about the state. In this case, agents may have
incentive to deviate from obedience. We consider this possibility in Section 4 when we
discuss experimental results.
Next we show that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where both private and
public signals are taken into account, if q > p but q is not too high.
Proposition 3. If q ∈ (p, q¯(p, n)), there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium, where
q¯(p, n) =
(
p
1−p
)n+1
2
1 +
(
p
1−p
)n+1
2
.
In the equilibrium, the agents whose private signal coincides with the public signal vote
accordingly with probability α∗ = 1. The agents whose private signal disagrees with the
public signal vote according to their private signal with probability
β∗ = 1− A(p, q, n)
p− A(p, q, n)(1− p) , where A(p, q, n) =
(
q
1− q
) 2
n−1
(
1− p
p
)n+1
n−1
.
Proof. This partially follows from Wit (1998).17 A direct proof is given in Appendix
A.
Note that in order for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist, the accuracy of the
public signal has to be lower than the threshold q¯(p, n). If this is the case, there are
two symmetric equilibria of interest, namely i) the obedient equilibrium where all agents
follow the public signal; and ii) the mixed strategy equilibrium in which the agents take
into account both signals probabilistically. Meanwhile, if the public signal is sufficiently
accurate relative to the private signals (q ≥ q¯(p, n)), the mixed strategy equilibrium does
not exist since it is more efficient for agents to be obedient to the public signal.
Let us consider the efficiency of the mixed strategy equilibrium in relation to that of the
obedient equilibrium, and also the informative equilibrium without public information.
Proposition 4. The mixed strategy equilibrium in Proposition 3 maximizes the efficiency
of the majority decision with respect to the symmetric strategy profile {α, β}.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 in Wit (1998). A direct proof is given in Appendix
A.
Since the obedient equilibrium requires α = 1 and β = 0, the mixed strategy equilib-
rium outperforms the obedient equilibrium. Another direct implication of Proposition 4
17Cf. The proof of Lemma 2 in Wit (1998).
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is that providing the committee with expert information is beneficial if the agents play
the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium:
Corollary. The mixed strategy equilibrium identified in Proposition 3 outperforms the
informative voting equilibrium in the absence of public information.
This holds true because informative voting is equivalent to α = β = 1, and Proposition
4 has just shown that the mixed strategy equilibrium (α∗ = 1 and β∗ ∈ (0, 1)) is optimal
with respect to the choice of α and β if q is higher than p but not too high.
It is straightforward to see that the informative voting equilibrium without public
information can be better or worse than the obedient equilibrium with public information.
However, the informative voting equilibrium without public information unambiguously
dominates the obedient equilibrium when the committee size is large enough. From the
next section onwards, we mostly focus on an interesting case where the public signal
is more accurate than the private signal but not too accurate, so that the informative
voting equilibrium in the absence of public information is more efficient than the obedient
equilibrium in the presence of public information. This case raises an interesting question
whether the provision of expert information enhances or diminishes efficiency when the
game is played by human subjects.18
3 Experimental Design
So far we have seen that the introduction of expert information (q > p) into a committee
leads to multiple equilibria of interest. On one hand, we have derived the mixed strategy
equilibrium where such expert information is used to enhance efficiency. On the other
hand, however, it also leads to the obedient equilibrium, where the outcome always follows
the expert signal so that the decision making efficiency may be reduced relative to the
informative voting equilibrium in the absence of expert information. Despite the (poten-
tially severe) inefficiency, the obedient equilibrium seems simple to play and requires very
little coordination among agents.
In order to examine how people vote in the presence of expert information, we use a
controlled laboratory experiment to collect data on voting behaviour when voters are given
two types of information, private and public. The experiment was conducted through
computers at the Behavioural Laboratory at the University of Edinburgh.19 We ran six
treatments, in order to vary committee size, whether or not the subjects received public
18Kawamura and Vlaseros (2016) show that there is also an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium that
outperforms the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium we saw in Proposition 3. However, in the present
paper we focus on the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium as an efficiency benchmark, because the
efficiency gain from playing the asymmetric pure equilibrium is marginal given the parameter values in
our experiment, and also because in the laboratory, coordinating on the asymmetric pure equilibrium
seems much more demanding than the symmetric mixed equilibrium.
19The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). See Appendix D for the experi-
mental instructions.
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Table 1: Treatments
Treatment q > p q < p Biased prior Comm. size No. of committees No. of subjects
1 yes no no 7 6 7× 2× 3 = 42
2 yes no no 15 6 15× 6 = 90
3 no no no 7 6 7× 2× 3 = 42
4 no no no 15 3 15× 3 = 45
5 no yes no 15 3 15× 3 = 45
6 yes no yes 15 3 15× 3 = 45
information, accuracy of public information, and presentation of public information. The
variations were introduced across treatments rather than within because, as we will see
shortly, we had to let our subjects play over relatively many periods, in order to ensure
that the subjects have enough (random) occurrences where the private and public signals
disagree. Each treatment involved either private information only or both private and
public information, and each session consisted of either two seven-person committees
or one fifteen-person committee (see Table1). The committees made simple majority
decisions for a binary state, namely which box (blue or yellow) contains a prize randomly
placed before the subjects receive their signals. The instructions were neutral with respect
to the two types of information: private information was literally referred to as “private
information” and public information was referred to as “public information” regardless of
its accuracy. After the instructions were given, the subjects were allowed to proceed to
the voting game only after they had given correct answers to all short-answer questions
about the instructions.20
For all treatments, we set the accuracy of each private signal (blue or yellow) at
p = 0.65. Treatments 1 and 2 in Table 1 had a public signal (also blue or yellow) and a
uniform prior, where the accuracy of the public signal was set at q = 0.7. We will refer to
these treatments as treatments with expert information. Treatments 3 and 4 are control
treatments without public information, in which the subjects received private signals only
and the prior was uniform. Treatment 5 featured a public signal whose accuracy was lower
than each private signal, such that q = 0.6. We also had a treatment (Treatment 6) where
public information with q = 0.7 was presented as a common biased prior. The prior in the
treatment was described as “the computer places the prize in the blue box 70% of time”
and the subjects received private signals independently in each period. We presented the
subjects with the accuracy of the signals clearly and explicitly in percentage terms, which
was described by referring to a twenty-sided dice in order to facilitate the understanding
by the subjects who may not necessarily be familiar with percentage representation of
uncertainty.21
The parameter values, which involve a small difference between p and q, were chosen
20If a subject gave a wrong answer, a detailed explanation was given and the subject was prompted to
answer the same question again.
21Every subject was given a real twenty-sided dice.
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so as to make the potential efficiency loss from the obedient outcome large for q > p. This
is a deliberate design feature to give the subjects strong incentive to avoid the obedient
outcome and (if possible) coordinate on the efficient equilibrium by putting a large weight
on the private signals.
Let PC(p, n) be the probability that the majority decision by an n-person committee
without public information matches the state, when the accuracy of the private signal
is p and all voters follow it.22 In the absence of a public signal, always following the
private signal is also the most efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Austen-Smith and
Banks, 1996). The predicted accuracy of decisions by seven-person committees with
private signals only is PC(0.65, 7) = 0.8002 and that by fifteen-person committees is
PC(0.65, 15) = 0.8868. Thus the accuracy of the public information q = 0.7 is above each
private signal but below what the committees can collectively achieve by aggregating their
private information. This implies that the obedient equilibrium, in which the accuracy of
decisions by committees of any size is q = 0.7 as they coincide with the public signal, is less
efficient than the informative voting equilibrium without public information. Note that
the symmetric mixed equilibrium we saw earlier for committees with expert information
achieve higher accuracy than PC(·, ·) (Corollary in Section 2.1), although the margin is
small under the parameter values here. Specifically, in the symmetric mixed equilibrium,
the predicted accuracy of seven-person committees with expert information is 0.8027; and
the predicted accuracy of fifteen-person committees is 0.8878.23
As we saw earlier, our equilibrium predictions include obedient voting. This may result
from the public signal being focal, either because it has superior accuracy when q > p, or
because it provides a “sunspot” for subjects to coordinate upon irrespective of the value of
q. In the recent voting experiment literature, various forms of systematic non-equilibrium
behaviour have been observed (e.g. Esponda and Vespa, 2014; Bhattacharya et al., 2015;
Bouton et al., 2016). A natural non-equilibrium prediction for our setup is naive sincere
voting, where subjects vote consistently according to the expert signal, simply because
it is the more accurate of the two signals. Obedient voting could thus be interpreted as
either equilibrium behaviour or non-equilibrium behaviour, and we discuss this issue in
Section 4.3.
Note that from the theoretical viewpoint, the subjects in the treatments with both
types of information would have had a non-trivial decision to make only when their
private and public signals disagree. Otherwise (when the two signals agree), they should
vote according to these signals in any of the three equilibria we are concerned with.
Since for q = 0.7 the probability of receiving disagreeing signals is only 0.44 (= 0.7 ×
0.35 + 0.3 × 0.65), the voting game was run for sixty periods to make sure each subject
has enough occurrences of disagreement. In every treatment the sixty periods of the
22As is well known, PC(p, n) ≡
n∑
k=n+12
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k.
23If q = 0.6 as in treatment 6, the public signal is ignored in equilibrium so that the accuracy of the
majority decision coincides with PC(0.65, 15) = 0.8868.
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Table 2: Voting behaviour and outcome with expert information
7-person committees 15-person committees
periods w/ expert efficient eqm. w/ expert efficient eqm.
vote for private signal overall 0.3501 0.9381 0.3089 0.9745
under disagreement 1-20 0.3511 0.2750
21-40 0.3571 0.3163
41-60 0.3421 0.3338
vote for signals overall 0.9488 1 0.9642 1
in agreement 1-20 0.9547 0.9625
21-40 0.9571 0.9689
41-60 0.9350 0.9612
majority decision coincided 0.9778 0.6654 1 0.6731
with expert signal
respective voting game were preceded by another ten periods of the voting game without
public information, in order to increase the complexity of information in stages for the
subjects in the public information treatments.24 We do not use the data from the first
ten periods of the treatments without public signals, but it does not alter our results
qualitatively.
After all subjects in a session cast their vote for each period, they were presented with
a feedback screen, which showed the true state, vote counts (how many voted for blue
and yellow respectively) of the committee they belong to, and payoff for the period.25
The committee membership was fixed throughout each session.26 This is primarily to
encourage, together with the feedback information, coordination towards the efficient
equilibrium.
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results. We first discuss the individual level
data to consider the change and heterogeneity of the subjects’ voting behaviour in the
treatments with expert information (q > p). We examine the majority decisions in those
treatments and contrast them to the equilibrium predictions we discussed in Section 2 and
other predictions based on bounded rationality. We then compare the efficiency of the
committee decisions in the treatments with expert information and that in the treatments
without expert information. Finally, we examine sources of inefficient obedient voting
24The subjects in the private information treatments played the same game for seventy periods but
they were given a short break after the first ten periods, in order to make the main part (sixty periods)
of all treatments closer.
25The feedback screen did not include the signals of the other agents or who voted for each colour.
This is to capture the idea of private information and anonymous voting, and also to avoid information
overload.
26In the treatments for two seven-person committees, the membership was randomly assigned at the
beginning of each session.
13
correlation coefficient = −0.1626
x
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
vo
te
 ra
tio
 fo
r p
riv
at
e 
sig
na
l u
nd
er
 d
isa
gr
ee
m
en
t
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
 
committee size = 7 (obs. 42)
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committee size = 15 (obs. 90)
ratio of votes for signals in agreement
Figure 1: Voting behaviour with signals in agreement and disagreement (x indicates the
symmetric mixed equilibrium strategy for each committee size)
observed for many subjects.
4.1 Voter choices with expert information
Let us first examine voting behaviour in the game with expert information. In Table 2 we
can see immediately that, when the private and public signals disagree, the subjects vote
against their private signals much more often than they should in the efficient (symmetric
mixed) equilibrium.
As the informational advantage of the expert information over private information is
not large (70% versus 65%), in the efficient equilibrium we saw in Proposition 3 the agents
should vote according to the private signal most of the time when the signals disagree
(93.8% in the seven-person and 97.5% in the fifteen-person committees, respectively).
In the laboratory, by contrast, when the two signals disagree the subjects vote against
their private signal in favour of the expert signal for a majority of the time, in both
the seven-person and fifteen-person committees. The frequency of following their private
signal is only 35.1% in the seven-person committees and 30.9% in the fifteen-person com-
mittees. This, together with the high frequency of voting according to agreeing signals
which is close to 100%, we find a significant overall tendency to follow expert information
both individually and collectively. Moreover, Table 2 indicates that the observed vot-
ing behaviour changes very little over the 60 periods. Over-reliance on the expert signal
under disagreement persisted and there is no obvious sign of move towards the efficient
equilibrium.
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Before discussing the influence of expert information on the voting outcome, let us
look at the heterogeneity of voting behaviour. Figure 1 plots each subject’s average voting
behaviour according to how often they vote for the signals in agreement (horizontal axes),
and how often they voted for the private signal under disagreement (vertical axes). The
top right corner corresponds to the strategy of only using the private signal, whereas the
bottom right corresponds to the strategy of only using the public signal. The size of each
circle represents the number of subjects whose average voting behaviour is the same. The
symmetric mixed equilibrium strategy we saw earlier in Table 2 is represented by x for
each committee size. We observe several subjects whose voting behaviour can be seen as
largely consistent with that in the equilibrium. 27
Now let us focus on the vertical axes in Figure 1. When the two signals disagree, the
highest fraction of the subjects vote against the private signal always or almost always, as
indicated by the concentration of circles on the bottom half of the squares. At the other
extreme, there are a small number of subjects who consistently follow private information,
around the top of the vertical axis particularly on the right hand side. There is significant
subject heterogeneity in voting behaviour, and the low overall frequency of following the
private signal as documented in Table 2 is largely driven by the “extreme followers”.
Meanwhile, if we focus on the horizontal axes, most circles are at or near 1, which implies
that we do not observe comparable heterogeneity when their signals agree. Most subjects
vote according to signals in agreement most of the time, and interestingly, across the
subjects we find no systematic association between their voting behaviour when the signals
agree and when they disagree. In what follows we focus primarily on voting behaviour
when the signals disagree.
Let us now look at the majority decisions in relation to the presence of the public signal.
A striking feature we observe in the last row of Table 2 is that in both expert treatments,
the decisions follow the expert information most of the time (97.8% for the seven-person
committees and 100% for the fifteen-person committees), while the predictions for the
efficient mixed equilibrium are only around 67%. Since the committee decisions mostly
follow the expert signal, their efficiency is almost (in the case of fifteen person committees,
exactly) identical to that of the expert signal.
4.2 Efficiency comparison
If we assume that the decisions in the expert treatments always follow the expert signal
and those in the treatments without expert information play the informative voting equi-
librium, in expectation we should observe the efficiency loss of PC(0.65, 7)− 0.7 = 0.1002
(14.3% reduction) for the seven-person committees and PC(0.65, 15)−0.7 = 0.1868 (26.7%
27 The large circles at the right bottom corners in Figure 1 represent 6 (out of 42) subjects in the seven-
person committees and 23 (out of 90) subjects in the fifteen-person committees who always followed the
public signal. The circle at the right top corner for the fifteen-person committees represents 4 subjects
who always voted for the private signal. Any other circles represent a single subject.
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reduction) for the fifteen-person committees, due to the presence of expert information.
Table 3: Voting behaviour in committees without expert information
7-person comm. 15-person comm.
periods w/o expert (2520 obs.) eqm. no w/o expert (2700 obs.) eqm.
vote for private signal overall 0.8472 1 0.9141 1
1-30 0.8505 0.9111
31-60 0.8437 0.9170
In the laboratory, the subjects in the control treatments without expert information
vote largely according to the equilibrium prediction of informative voting (Table 3). We
observe some deviation from the equilibrium strategy, as commonly observed in the liter-
ature on voting experiments for such a benchmark case. Note that, from each subject’s
perspective, one private signal is less informative of the true state than a pair of private
and public signals in agreement. We have seen in Table 2 that the proportion of votes
for the agreeing signals is about 95% in both seven-person and fifteen-person committees,
which is higher than the proportion of votes for the private signal when expert information
is absent. This is consistent with, for example, a finding by Morton and Tyran (2011)
that the subjects are more likely to follow their private signal when it is more accurate.
Table 4: Majority decisions and observed efficiency
7-person comm. (360 obs. each) 15-person comm. (180 & 360 obs.)
w/o expert w/ expert w/o expert w/ expert
Observed efficiency 0.7000 0.7389 0.8278 0.7000
Realized efficiency of expert signal n/a 0.7222 n/a 0.7000
Efficiency if subjects had voted for 0.7972 0.8195 0.8778 0.8833
realized private signals
Since informative voting achieves the highest efficiency in the voting game without
expert information, any deviation from the equilibrium strategy leads to efficiency loss.
The first row on Table 4 records the observed (ex post) efficiency in the four treatments
(Treatments 1-4). We can see that the efficiency of the decisions by the seven-person
committees without expert information is merely 70.0%, while if every member voted
according to the private signal following the equilibrium strategy, given the actual signal
realizations in the treatment, they could have achieved 79.7%. Meanwhile the seven-
person committees with expert information achieve 73.9%, even though they could have
achieved higher efficiency (82.0%) had they always voted according to the private sig-
nal.28 The precise comparison of efficiency between committees with and without expert
28Note that every agent voting according to the private signal is not an equilibrium in the presence of
expert information (Proposition 1). Here we record the hypothetical efficiencies for both seven-person
and fifteen-person committees in order to represent the quality of the realized private signals in each
treatment.
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information is difficult due to different signal realizations in each treatment. As shown in
Table 5 a simple random effects model where each session is treated as an individual in
the panel indicates that for the seven-person committees the effect of expert information
on efficiency is not statistically significant.
Table 5: Random effects probit: dependent variable = 1 if committee decision matches
the state and 0 otherwise
Independent variable 7-person comm. 15-person comm.
Expert information 0.1658 -0.4210***
(0.2614) (0.1303)
Constant 0.8783*** 0.9454***
(0.1826) (0.1103)
Observations 360 540
Log likelihood -212.3833 -302.6018
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** significant at 1% level
The last two columns of Table 4 give us a somewhat clearer picture. In the fifteen-
person committees without expert information, since the agents do not deviate much from
the equilibrium strategy of informative voting, the efficiency loss compared to the hypo-
thetical informative voting is small (82.8% vs. 87.8%). In the fifteen-person committees
with expert information, since all decisions follow the expert information, the efficiency is
exactly the same as that of the expert signals, which is 70.0%. Here the negative effect of
expert information on efficiency is large (82.8% → 70.0%) and indeed Table 5 indicates
that the effect is statistically significant.
4.3 Why was expert information so influential?
As we have seen earlier, the committee decisions follow the expert signal most of the
time (97.8% for seven-person committees and 100% for fifteen-person committees) as in
the obedient equilibrium, where the decision follows the expert signal with probability
1. In the efficient equilibrium we saw, this rate ranges from 67% to 72% for both seven-
person and fifteen-person committees. What leads the subjects to such a clearly inefficient
outcome?
To examine this question, let us first see whether obedience to the expert signal in the
data is consistent with the individual best response, given the subjects’ voting behaviour.
Figure 2 illustrates this, with the assumption that the other agents play symmetric strate-
gies. In the figure, the horizontal axes represent α, the probability that the agents vote
according to the signals when they agree; and the vertical axes represent β, the probability
that the agents vote according to the private signal when the signals disagree. The shaded
areas indicate the ranges of α and β such that, with regard to the model in Section 2, an
agent’s best response given that the other agents adopt α and β is to vote according to the
17
Figure 2: Data (mean frequencies for each committee size represented by a dot with 95%
confidence intervals) and individual best response under disagreement given the other
voters’ behaviour (shaded: follow the expert signal, unshaded: follow the private signal)
expert signal. Conversely, on the unshaded areas the best response is to vote according to
the private signal.29 The dots are from the overall frequencies in Table 2 and they clearly
indicate that in both seven- and fifteen-person committees the individual best response
given the data is to vote according to the private signal when the signals disagree.30 The
prevalence of obedient voting in the data therefore strongly suggests that many subjects
fail to best respond, if we assume that the data represents symmetric strategies and the
subjects could infer α and β.31
In what follows we report on additional treatments to gain further insights into the
over-reliance on the public signal and many subjects’ failure to individually best respond,
focusing on fifteen-person committees.32 Specifically, in one of the treatments (Treatment
5) the expert information was presented as a biased prior to suppress the salience of the
information. In the other (Treatment 6), the expert signal was replaced by a public signal
whose accuracy is lower than the accuracy of each private signal (q < p), in order to see
whether the reliance is attributed to i) the presence of a public signal to coordinate upon,
in which case its accuracy does not necessarily matter, or ii) the superior accuracy of the
expert signal. Furthermore, both of the additional treatments and three sessions/groups
for fifteen-person committees with expert information (Treatment 2) involved an incen-
29See Appendix A for the derivation of Figure 2. Arbitrary α and β of the other agents can be seen
as trembles relative to the obedient equilibrium (α = 1 and β = 0), where errors occur with different
probabilities depending on whether the signals agree or disagree.
30The confidence intervals are larger for the seven-person committees mostly due to the smaller sample
size (42 for seven-person and 90 for fifteen-person committees).
31We will discuss these assumptions later.
32We discuss other non-equilibrium explanations for the observed over-reliance in Appendix B.
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Table 6: OLS estimates for 15-person committees: dependent variable = frequency of
votes for private signal under disagreement
Independent variable
Treatment 5: Expert info as prior 0.2897*** 0.2820*** 0.3471***
(0.0608) (0.0743) (0.0839)
Treatment 6: q < p 0.5102*** 0.5291*** 0.5752***
(0.0546) (0.0635) (0.0723)
Correct understanding of 0.1473** 0.2505** 0.2151***
information aggregation (0.0621) (0.1225) (0.0637)
Treatment 5 × Correct understanding -0.1744
(0.1630)
Treatment 6 × Correct understanding -0.1407
(0.1390)
Frequency of voting for -0.2071 -0.0849 -0.1182 -0.0398
signals in agreement (0.1893) (0.2409) (0.2483) (0.2457)
No. of periods with disagreement 0.0064 0.0066 0.0053 -0.0019
(0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0072)
Constant 0.3320 0.1587 0.1908 0.1547
(0.2214) (0.2750) (0.2822) (0.2650)
Session dummies No No No Yes
Observations 180 135 135 135
Adjusted R-squared 0.3193 0.3239 0.3223 0.3728
Robust (unclustered) standard errors in parentheses. Treatment 2 (expert) is the base treatment.
Correct understanding = 1 if a subject answers both questions correctly and otherwise 0.
The number of periods with disagreement varied (18-39) across subjects. The first model
includes observations from three sessions of Treatment 2 without the questionnaire.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
tivized questionnaire, in order to assess each subject’s basic understanding of information
aggregation. This allows us to consider the possibility that some subjects vote without
even thinking about the other subjects’ private information or votes.
4.3.1 Salience of expert information
As noted earlier, one possible reason for obedience to the public signal is that it was
overwhelmingly salient as it appeared on every decision making screen, even though our
instructions were neutral and we never used the word “expert” or any labelling that hints
at superiority except the accuracy itself. Also, the combination of a uniform prior and
a public signal may have looked more complex to subjects than biased prior with no
additional public information, although these are theoretically equivalent. In Treatment
5 we presented expert information as a common biased prior, such that the prize is placed
in the blue box with 70% probability for all periods. In order to further reduce the
salience of the information, how the prize is allocated at the beginning of each period
was explained only once before the voting game started, and only the private information
with 65% accuracy was on the screen in each period.
19
Table 7: Voting behaviour in 15-person committees
periods q > p as prior q < p q > p as expert
vote for private signal overall 0.6035 0.8162 0.3089
under disagreement 1-30 0.5931 0.8122 0.2961
31-60 0.6120 0.8204 0.3219
vote for signals overall 0.9282 0.9796 0.9642
in agreement 1-30 0.9216 0.9845 0.9662
31-60 0.9358 0.9744 0.9622
vote for private signal (unconditional) overall 0.7893 0.9041 0.6781
majority decision coincided 0.9222 0.7389 1
with expert signal
In Table 6 we find that the subjects in the treatment are significantly more likely to vote
according to the private signal when the signals disagreed, compared to the treatment with
a uniform prior and expert information.33 In Table 7 we see that when expert information
is presented as a biased prior, the subjects follow the private signal 60% of the time under
disagreement, which is almost exactly in between 31% we saw earlier in Table 2 for the
treatment with a uniform prior with expert information, and the equilibrium prediction
of 97%. Meanwhile, the last row of Table 7 indicates that the majority decisions are much
more clearly leaning towards the prior: they follow the biased prior 92% of the time while
in the efficient equilibrium it should be 67%. Clearly, framing expert information as a
common biased prior mitigates obedience, although it still has a much larger influence on
the voting behaviour and majority decisions than in the efficient equilibrium.
4.3.2 Accuracy of public information
Another possible reason for obedience is that the presence of public information, which can
in principle be either more or less accurate than private information, rather than expert
information, leads the subjects to coordinate upon the inefficient obedient equilibrium. To
examine this possibility, in Treatment 6 the accuracy of the public signal was set at q = 0.6
while we kept the accuracy of the private signal (p = 0.65) as in the other treatments. In
order to achieve efficiency, the subjects should completely ignore the public information
and vote according to their private information only, which is also the efficient equilibrium
as in the game without public information.
Both Table 6 and Table 7 show that the voting behaviour change significantly from
that in the treatment with expert information and the subjects follow the public signal
with q < p much less frequently. More importantly, the voting behaviour in the treatment
is very close to that in the treatment without public information we saw in Table 3. In
particular, the unconditional frequency of following the private signal is 90.4% in the
33We obtain qualitatively very similar results from random effects probit models. See Appendix C for
details.
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treatment with q < p and 91.4% in the treatment without public information. The
excessive obedience seems to be caused by the superior accuracy (q > p), not by the mere
presence of public information.
4.3.3 Under-appreciation of information aggregation
The results from the two additional treatments so far reveal that neither the salience
of expert information nor the presence of public information to coordinate upon can
adequately explain the obedient voting and outcome. This leads us to explore yet another
possibility that obedient subjects are unable to take into account information aggregation
of private signals and vote as if they were facing a single-person (rather than group)
decision problem.
Table 8: Proportion of subjects choosing correct answer (15-person committees)
treatment (45 obs. each)
q > p q > p as prior q < p
both correct 0.3333 0.4444 0.2222
answers correct for q > p 0.4000 0.5330 0.2444
correct for q < p 0.8222 0.8667 0.8667
Since it is difficult to directly observe how subjects perceive the voting game, we focus
on their basic recognition of information aggregation in voting. Specifically, we used an
incentivized questionnaire at the end of sessions, which was presented as a straightforward
extension of the voting game with public information (or the biased prior), where each
subject chooses “how the computer votes” on all voters’ behalf.34 In particular, we let
the subjects choose between i) decision that follows the public signal only (“the computer
casts all votes according to public information only”), in which case the accuracy of the
unanimous decision is q; and ii) majority decision based on votes according to all 15
private signals with accuracy p = 0.65, where the corresponding accuracy of the majority
decision is PC(0.65, 15) = 0.8868. We asked two questions for q = 0.7 and q = 0.6
respectively, so that for both questions the choice that maximizes the subjects’ expected
payoff is to let the computer vote according to all private signals. Since the subjects
answered the questionnaire after they played the voting game, they might have learnt
from the observations from feedback information during the voting game. Therefore, the
answers from the treatment with q < p may better indicate pre-learning answers to the
question with q > p, and vice versa.35
34The questionnaire was administered in three sessions/groups of each treatment for fifteen-person
committees. The other three (out of six) sessions of the treatment with expert information (Treatment
2) did not have the questionnaire.
35Administering the questionnaire after the game was played, rather than before has the important
advantage that the subjects would have understood the questions better, as the questions were phrased
in accordance with the game they had played. One natural concern is that the answers might have been
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A striking finding from Table 8 is that many subjects severely underestimate the
benefit of the aggregation of private information relative to public information, especially
for the question with q > p. Overall, a majority of the subjects prefer a decision based
on the public signal alone to a decision based on all private signals, at least for one
of the questions. This suggests the prevalence of severe underestimation of information
aggregation. While the efficient equilibrium can achieve higher efficiency than voting
according to the private signals only, the relative efficiency gain is marginal. Therefore
it is likely that the subjects who let the computer vote according to the public signal
only perceive the other subjects’ private signals and votes in the game as irrelevant. Such
subjects would mostly focus on the individual comparison between their private signal
and the public signal. These subjects can be thought of as non-strategic, sincere voters
who take the voting choice as an individual decision problem.
Table 9: Voting behaviour in 15-person committees with q > p
answers to questionnaire
periods both correct (15/45) otherwise (30/45)
vote for private signal overall 0.4593 0.2124
under disagreement 1-30 0.4624 0.1947
31-60 0.4564 0.2298
vote for signals overall 0.9846 0.9712
in agreement 1-30 0.9811 0.9771
31-60 0.9882 0.9652
The subjects’ voting behaviour in the presence of expert information is indeed con-
sistent with this view. Table 6 we saw earlier confirms that those who answer both
questions correctly are significantly more likely to vote for the private signal when the
signals disagree.36 Interestingly, the interaction terms with the treatment dummies are
not statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of the understanding of information
aggregation on voting behaviour does not vary according to the nature of public informa-
tion. Table 9 splits the voting behaviour according to whether the subjects understand
information aggregation. Indeed those who fail to understand its benefit vote for the pri-
vate signal much less frequently (only 21%) than the public signal signal when the signals
disagree. In contrast, the average voting behaviour of those who answer both questions
correctly is close to 50:50. Also, in Table 9 we do not observe any clear sign that the
subjects who give a wrong answer in the questionnaire are ignorant and pay less attention
to the screen or choices they make. The frequencies of voting for the signals in agreement
largely driven by how the subjects played the game, rather than how they perceived the questions as
single-person decision problems. However, this would not be problematic in our case, since the questions
were purely on how the computer would vote, and thus unlike the voting game, they did not involve
anything to do with decisions by the other subjects.
36The dummy variable (“Correct understanding of information aggregation”) is 1 if a subject answered
both questions correctly and 0 otherwise.
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are very close between those who give the correct answers (98.5%) and those who do not
(97.1%).
Table 10: Prediction on other committee members’ answers to questionnaire
prediction on preference of majority
own preference (obs. 135, pooled) aggr. of private info (q = 0.7) aggr. of private info (q = 0.6)
aggr. of private info (q = 0.7 & 0.6) 0.2889 0.9778
public information 0.0667 0.9333
How did the subjects perceive other subjects’ understanding of information aggrega-
tion? We also asked subjects how a majority of the committee members would answer the
questions. We can see in Table 10 that only about a third (29%) of those who gave the
correct answers (i.e. preferred the aggregation of private information to public informa-
tion) believe that a majority would also prefer aggregating private signals when q = 0.7.
This indicates that those who recognize the benefit of information aggregation are well
aware that many others fail to understand it.
Our findings regarding the appreciation of information aggregation and overall major-
ity decisions, namely that i) a majority of the subjects severely underestimate the effect of
information aggregation of private signals; and ii) all majority decisions follow the public
signal in the fifteen-person committees with expert information, suggest that the subjects
who recognize the benefit of information aggregation may nonetheless be unable to change
the inefficient outcome.
Our earlier discussion for Figure 2 on individual best response assumes symmetric
strategies and the subjects knowing empirical α and β, which implies they must be aware of
the strictly positive pivot probability. However, given that all majority decisions followed
the expert signal in the fifteen-person committees, some subjects might believe that a
majority of the committee members would always follow the expert signal (whatever the
reason behind obedience is) and thus they could have no influence on the outcome as they
would never be pivotal. Subjects with such a belief face indifference, and voting for the
expert signal under disagreement does not contradict their payoff maximization.
Furthermore, needless to say, the understanding of information aggregation is only a
basic necessary condition to coordinate rationally for efficiency. The subjects would have
to perform pivotal calculations and hypothetical thinking, which are found to be difficult
even in a simpler setup (Esponda and Vespa, 2014). This, together with the superior
accuracy of the expert signal, may also partly explain a significant proportion of votes for
the expert signal under disagreement even among the subjects who answer the questions
correctly.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has studied the effects of a public signal on voting behaviour in committees
of common interest. We have reported on the laboratory experiment we conducted to see
how human subjects react to expert information. In particular we set the parameter values
in such a way that the efficiency of the obedient equilibria is lower than what the agents
could have achieved in the informative voting equilibrium without expert information.
We find that the subjects follow expert information so frequently that most of the time
the committee decisions are the same as what the expert signal indicates. This is in sharp
contrast to the predictions from the efficient equilibrium, where only a small number of
agents should (in expectation) follow the expert signal and as a result the committee
decision and expert signal may not necessarily coincide.
We have then contrasted the results to those from the control treatments where the
subjects receive private signals only. We find that the efficiency without expert informa-
tion is significantly higher than the efficiency with expert information for fifteen-person
committees. That is, the provision of otherwise efficiency enhancing expert information
actually reduces efficiency in the laboratory.
The result of the incentivized questionnaire reveals that more than a majority of the
subjects severely under-appreciate the efficiency gain from information aggregation and
they very frequently follow expert information. They can be considered as non-strategic
voters, because given their (mis)understanding of information aggregation, they would
vote for the public signal regardless of the other subjects’ voting strategies. This suggests
that even those who do recognize the benefit of information aggregation and understand
the game correctly may be “stuck” in an inefficient outcome, as they are a minority. Our
findings have potentially important implications for how expert opinions should be pre-
sented and processed in collective decision making. Voters may be prone to manipulation
by “experts”, and the consequence of excessive reliance on expert information may be
particularly severe for large committees or referendums, where the potential benefit of
information aggregation is likely to be high.
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6 Appendix A
6.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Consider agent i’s strategy in the putative equilibrium where all the other agents
follow their private signal. He computes the difference in the expected payoff between
voting for A and B, conditional on his private and public signals, in the event where he is
pivotal. Let Piv(v−i) be the probability that agent i is pivotal, given all the other agents’
strategies. The payoff difference is given by
w(σi, σE) ≡ E[ui(A, s)− ui(B, s)|Piv(v−i), σi, σE]Pr[Piv(v−i), σi, σE]
= 12Pr[σE|s = A]Pr[σi|s = A]Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = A]
− 12Pr[σE|s = B]Pr[σi|s = B]Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = B], (1)
where the equality follows from the independence of the signals. Without loss of generality,
let us assume σi = B and σE = A. From (1) we have
w(B,A) = 12
q(1− p) (n− 1)![(
n−1
2
)
!
]
2
p
n−1
2 (1− p)n−12

− 12
(1− q)p (n− 1)![(
n−1
2
)
!
]
2
p
n−1
2 (1− p)n−12

= 12(q − p)
(n− 1)![(
n−1
2
)
!
]
2
p
n−1
2 (1− p)n−12 > 0.
The inequality holds since q > p. This implies that agent i votes for A despite her private
signal B. Thus every agent voting according to the private signal is not a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
6.2 Proposition 2
Proof. In the symmetric obedient equilibrium we have (α, β) = (1, 0) for any agent. Let
each agent’s totally mixed strategy such that (α, β) = (1/2, 1/2) with probability  and
(α, β) = (1, 0) with probability 1− . In order for an agent to be pivotal, it has to be that
n−1
2 out of n− 1 vote against the public signal.
Let l be the number of agents who follow (α, β) = (1/2, 1/2). Given l ≥ n−12 , the
probability of being pivotal conditional on l is(
l
n
2
)(

2
)l (n− 1
l
)
(1− )n−1−l,
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where
(
l
n
2
)(

2
)l
is the probability that l agents play (α, β) = (1/2, 1/2) and
(
n− 1
l
)
(1−
)n−1−l is the probability that n−12 of them vote against the public signal. The probability
of being pivotal is then given by
n−1∑
i=n−12
(
l
n
2
)(

2
)l (n− 1
l
)
(1− )n−1−l,
which clearly does not depend on signal realizations. This implies that a pivotal event
is uninformative about the signals, and the agent prefers to vote according to the public
signal if q ≥ p.
6.3 Proposition 3
Before deriving the equilibrium, it is useful to note that the mixed strategy equilibrium
takes a “hybrid” form, where mixing occurs only when the private and public signals
disagree.
Lemma 1. Suppose there exists a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies. In such an equilibrium, any agent whose private signal coincides with the public
signal votes according to the signals with probability 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume σE = A to prove the lemma.
Define
F (A) ≡ Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = A] =
n−1∑
k=0
min(k,n−12 )∑
j=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
×
(
k
j
)
αj(1− α)k−j
(
n− 1− k
n−1
2 − j
)
(1− β)n−12 −jβ n−12 −k+j (2)
and
F (B) ≡ Pr[Piv(v−i)|s = B] =
n−1∑
k=0
min(k,n−12 )∑
j=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
×
(
k
j
)
βj(1− β)k−j
(
n− 1− k
n−1
2 − j
)
(1− α)n−12 −jαn−12 −k+j.. (3)
Using F (A) and F (B), we rewrite
w(A,A) = 12 [qpF (A)− (1− q)(1− p)F (B)] (4)
w(B,A) = 12 [q(1− p)F (A)− (1− q)pF (B)] . (5)
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Note that (4) and (5) incorporate each agent’s Bayesian updating on the state and the
private signals other agents may have received, conditional on his own signal and the
public signal.
In order to have fully mixing equilibrium, namely α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and β∗ ∈ (0, 1), we must
have w(A,A) = 0 and w(B,A) = 0 simultaneously for indifference. In what follows, we
show that w(A,A) > 0 for any α and β, which implies in equilibrium we must have α∗ = 1
and if mixing occurs it must be only for β, that is, when the private and public signals
disagree. Specifically, we show that F (A) > F (B), which readily implies w(A,A) > 0
from (4).
From (4) and (5) we have F (A)− F (B) > 0 if
αj(1− α)k−j(1− β)n−12 −jβ n−12 −k+j > βj(1− β)k−j(1− α)n−12 −jαn−12 −k+j
⇔ β(1− β) > α(1− α)
⇔ (α + β − 1)(α− β) > 0. (6)
To see that (6) holds we will show that in equilibrium α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0 and α∗ − β∗ > 0.
Let us first observe that α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0. The difference in the difference in payoffs
between voting for A and B is given by
w(A,A)− w(B,A) = q(2p− 1)2 F (A) +
(1− q)(2p− 1)
2 F (B) > 0, (7)
since both terms in the right hand side are positive since p, q > 1/2. Thus, given σE = A,
the equilibrium probability of voting for A when σi = A must be strictly greater than
that of voting for A when σi = B, which implies37
α∗ + β∗ − 1 > 0. (8)
Second, let us show that α∗ > β∗. We assume instead that α∗ ≤ β∗ in equilibrium and
derives a contradiction. There is no hybrid equilibrium such that α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and β∗ = 1,
because from (6) and (8), α∗ ≤ β∗ implies F (A) ≤ F (B) and we may have a fully mixed
equilibrium, in which case w(A,A) = w(B,A) = 0. From (4) we have
w(A,A) = 0⇒ F (A)
F (B) =
(1− q)(1− p)
qp
, (9)
and from (5)
w(B,A) = 0⇒ F (A)
F (B) =
(1− q)p
q(1− p) . (10)
We can see that (9) and (10) hold simultaneously if and only if p = 1/2, which is a
37See Lemma 1 in Wit (1998) for a similar argument.
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contradiction, since p ∈ (1/2, 1]. Thus we conclude that α∗ > β∗ in any mixed strategy
equilibrium equilibrium.
Combining α∗ > β∗ and (8), we can see that (6) holds. Thus we have F (A)−F (B) > 0
and w(A,A) > 0, which implies any mixed strategy equilibrium has to have a hybrid form,
such that α∗ = 1.
Lemma 1 is not surprising, because when both signals coincide they would jointly be
very informative about the actual state. The non-trivial part of the lemma is that this
intuition holds regardless of the mixing probability when the signals disagree. Thanks to
the lemma we can focus on mixing when the private and public signals disagree.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 1 any mixed strategy equilibrium involves vi(A,A) =
vi(B,B) = 1 and vi(A,B) = vi(B,A) = β ∈ (0, 1) for any i ∈ N . When the state and
the public signal match, the probability of each individual voting correctly for the state
is given by
ra ≡ p+ (1− p)(1− β), (11)
and when the state and the public signal disagree, the probability of each individual voting
correctly is
rb ≡ (1− p)× 0 + pβ = pβ. (12)
To have β∗ ∈ (0, 1), we need any agent to be indifference when the two signals disagree:
w(B,A) = q(1− p)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
r
n−1
2
a (1− ra)n−12 − (1− q)p
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
r
n−1
2
b (1− rb)
n−1
2 = 0 (13)
⇒ 1− pβ1− β(1− p) =
(
q
1− q
) 2
n−1
(
1− p
p
)n+1
n−1
(14)
⇒ β∗ = 1− A(p, q, n)
p− A(p, q, n)(1− p) , (15)
such that A(p, q, n) =
(
q
1−q
) 2
n−1
(
1−p
p
)n+1
n−1 . Thus when β∗ ∈ (0, 1) we obtain a mixed
strategy equilibrium of the hybrid form (α∗ = 1).
Finally, solving β∗ = 0 for q, we see that β∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if q ∈
p, ( p1−p)n+12
1+( p1−p)
n+1
2
.
The uniqueness follows from the fact that the left hand side of (14) is strictly decreasing
in β.
6.4 Proposition 4
Proof. In what follows we will find α = vi(A,A) = vi(B,B) and β = vi(B,A) = vi(A,B)
that maximize the probability of the majority outcome matching the correct state. Condi-
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tional on the state s = A and σE = A, let the ex ante probability of each agent voting for
A be, from (11), ra ≡ pα+ (1− p)(1− β). Also from (12), conditional on the state s = A
and σE = B, let the probability of each agent voting for A be rb ≡ pβ + (1 − p)(1 − α).
Using ra and rb, the ex ante probability P (α, β) that the majority decision matches the
state can be written as
P (α, β) =Pr[M = s|s] = Pr[M = A|s = A]P [A] + Pr[M = B|s = B]P [B]
=Pr[M = A|s = A]12 + Pr[M = B|s = B]
1
2 = Pr[M = A|s = A]
=Pr[σE = A|s = A]Pr[M = A, σE = A|s = A]
+ Pr[σE = B|s = A]Pr[M = A, σE = B|s = A]
=q
n∑
k=n+12
(
n
k
)
rkA(1− rA)n−k + (1− q)
n∑
k=n+12
(
n
k
)
rkB(1− rB)n−k. (16)
Note that for
g(x) ≡
n∑
k=n+12
(
n
k
)
xk(1− x)n−k
we have
dg(x)
dx
= n
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(x(1− x))n−12 .
Partially differentiating (16) with respect to α and β, we obtain
∂P (α, β)
∂α
= npq
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(ra(1− ra))
n−1
2
− n(1− p)(1− q)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(rb(1− rb))
n−1
2 (17)
and
∂P (α, β)
∂β
= −(1− p)nq
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(ra(1− ra))
n−1
2
+ pn(1− q)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(rb(1− rb))
n−1
2 . (18)
From (18), taking the first order condition with respect β we have
∂P (α, β)
∂β
= 0⇔
(
rb(1− rb)
ra(1− ra)
)n−1
2
= q(1− p)(1− q)p. (19)
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If (19) holds, then the derivative with respect to α, (17), is strictly positive for any
α ∈ [0, 1] since
∂P (α, β)
∂α
> 0⇔ qp(1− q)(1− p) >
(
rb(1− rb)
ra(1− ra)
)n−1
2
⇔ qp(1− q)(1− p) >
q(1− p)
(1− q)p
⇔ p > 12 .
Therefore we have a unique corner solution for α, namely α = 1, which coincides with the
equilibrium α∗ in the hybrid mixed strategy identified in Proposition 3. Note that the
first order condition (18) and the indifference condition for the mixed strategy equilibrium
(13) also coincide. Thus β = β∗ satisfies the first order condition.
It remains to show that the second order condition for the maximization with respect
to β is satisfied. Since P (α,β) is a polynomial it suffices to show that
∂2P (α, β)
∂β2
< 0⇒ −(1− p)nq
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(ra(1− ra))
n−3
2 (1− p− 2β(1− p)2)
< pn(1− q)
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
(rb(1− rb))
n−3
2 (p− 2βp2). (20)
At β = β∗, (20) reduces to
(1− pβ)(1− 2(1− p)β) > (1− 2pβ)(1− (1− p)β),
which holds since p > 12 . Since P (α, β) is a continuously differentiable function on a closed
interval, the local maximum at {α, β} = {1, β∗} is also the global maximum.
6.5 Figure 2
Let agents with agreeing signals vote for the common signal with probability 1 − ε and
for the other signal with probability ε and agents with disagreeing signals vote for the
public signal with probability 1− δ and for their private signal with probability δ .
From the indifference and optimality conditions above, by setting
ra ≡ pa+ (1− p)(1− β), (21)
and
rb ≡ pβ + (1− p)(1− a), (22)
we can set a = 1 − ε and β = δ. Thus, using equations 19 and 20 we can derive
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thresholds for the asymmetric trembling probabilities for which ∂P (α,β)
∂β
< 0 and indicate
when the symmetric equilibrium fails to be trembling hand perfect. As an example, setting
n = 15, ε = 0.95, δ = 0.35, p = 0.65 and q = 0.70, we observe that ∂P (α,β)
∂β
< 0 and then
the symmetric equilibrium is not trembling hand perfect for asymmetric trembles.
7 Appendix B: Alternative Interpretations Based on
Bounded Rationality
7.1 Quantal response equilibrium
In the literature on voting experiments, it is common to consider quantal response equi-
librium (QRE; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) to see whether the experimental data on
subjects’ actions can be interpreted as deviation from a particular equilibrium prediction
of interest. Let us see whether subjects’ aggregate behaviour can be systematically linked
to the symmetric mixed equilibrium in Proposition 3, which is more efficient than the obe-
dient equilibrium and the informative voting equilibrium without public information.38
Let us derive the logistic quantal response function for the rationality parameter λ,
where λ → ∞ corresponds to perfect rationality and the symmetric mixed equilibrium
under consideration and λ = 0 corresponds to complete randomization (voting for either
alternative with 50% regardless of the information). Let α¯ = v−i(A,A) = v−i(B,B) and
β¯ = v−i(B,A) = v−i(A,B) for any −i ∈ {1, 2, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., n}. That is, α¯ is the
probability that all agents except agent i vote according to the signals in agreement, and
β¯ is the probability that all agents except agent i vote according to the private signal
when the signals disagree. Given that the expert signal is correct, the probability of each
agent −i voting for the correct state is ra ≡ pα¯ + (1 − p)(1 − β¯). Also, given that the
expert signal is correct, the probability of each agent −i voting for the correct state is
rb ≡ pβ¯ + (1− p)(1− α¯). Suppose these agents follow the mixed strategy as described in
Proposition 3.
If agent i votes according to the signals in agreement, his expected payoff is given by
E[uAAi (α¯, β¯)] =
pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, ra)
+ (1− p)(1− q)
pq + (1− p)(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, rb),
where
G(n, l, x) ≡
n∑
k=l
 n
k
xk(1− x)n−k.
38As observed by Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) (see pp.417-8), if one allows asymmetric strategies in
voting games, the QRE correspondence for each voter may bifurcate and as a result become too complex
to obtain numerically or interpret, which is the case in our model.
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If agent i votes against the signals in agreement, his expected payoff is given by
E[uAOi (α¯, β¯)] =
pq
pq + (1− p)(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, ra)
+ (1− p)(1− q)
pq + (1− p)(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2− 1, rb).
If agent i votes according to the private signal when the private and public signals
disagree, his expected payoff is given by
E[uDPi (α¯, β¯)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, ra)
+ p(1− q)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2− 1, rb).
If agent i votes according to the public signal when the private and public signals
disagree, his expected payoff is given by
E[uDEi (α¯, β¯)] =
q(1− p)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2− 1, ra)
+ p(1− q)
q(1− p) + p(1− q)G(n− 1, (n+ 1)/2, rb).
Hence we have
α¯(λ) = exp(λE[u
AA
i (α¯, β¯)])
exp(λE[uAAi (α¯, β¯)]) + exp(λE[uAOi (α¯, β¯)])
, (23)
β¯(λ) = exp(λE[u
DP
i (α¯, β¯)])
exp(λE[uDPi (α¯, β¯)]) + exp(λE[uDEi (α¯, β¯)])
. (24)
The α¯ and β¯ that satisfy the system of (23) and (24) for p = 0.65, q = 0.7, and
n = 7, 15 as in the experiment are plotted on Figure 3, where the square dots correspond
to λ → ∞ and thus the symmetric mixed equilibrium for each treatment. Clearly the
data, represented by the circle dots, is further away from the QRE predictions.
In particular, with respect to the predictions, the likelihood of making an error when
the signals agree is significantly different from when the signals disagree (as can also be
seen in Table 2 and Figure 1). This is because, while the voting behaviour with signals
in agreement is very close to the equilibrium prediction (voting for these signals with
probability 1), the voting behaviour with signals in disagreement deviates substantially
from that in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus we are unable to assign a
reasonable common parameter to reflect the degree of error for this equilibrium.
Moreover it is easy to show from (24) that, if we fix α¯ = 1 and posit that the error
occurs only when the signals disagree, we have β¯(λ) ≥ 1/2 for any λ ∈ [0,∞). This is
inconsistent with the data which indicates β around 32-35% (Table 2).
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Figure 3: Data and logistic QRE predictions for symmetric mixed equilibrium
Table 11: Proportion of votes for private signal under disagreement
7-person committees 15-person committees
vote for private signal first period of session 0.1000 (2/20) 0.1351 (5/37)
first occurrence of disagreement 0.1190 (5/42) 0.1444 (13/90)
7.2 Cognitive hierarchy
Another approach to understanding the subjects’ behaviour especially in the first period
or the first occurrence of disagreement would be to use a cognitive hierarchy (level-k)
model (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Nagel, 1995). In such a model, each player in a game has
a type denoted by level-k for a positive integer k. Level-k players anchor their beliefs in a
non-strategic level-0 players and adjust the beliefs with (virtual) iterated best responses,
in such a way that level-k players (for k ≥ 1) rationally best responds based on the belief
that all other players are level-(k − 1).
In order to apply the model we need to determine how level-0 voters should behave,
which seems non-trivial in our setup. If we assume, following Costinot and Kartik (2007),
that level-0 voters vote according to their private signal, level-1 voters should vote accord-
ing to the public signal, in which case level-2 voters become indifferent with respect to
their own vote, and thus it is impossible to obtain clear predictions for the behaviour of
level-k voters for k ≥ 2. This is also the case if level-0 voters randomize equally between
the two choices regardless of their signal realizations; and if level-0 voters vote according
to the two signals when they agree and randomize equally when they disagree. Mean-
while, if level-0 voters are to follow the public signal, then naturally level-1 voters become
indifferent and we have no clear prediction for any k.
In Table 11 we observe that a much higher proportion of the subjects voted for the
33
public signal in the first period or the first period under disagreement, compared to later
periods (see also Table 2). One interpretation of this is that a substantive proportion of
the subjects believed that the others would vote for the private signal or disregard the
signals and randomize, as level-0 voters could do, and best responded to such beliefs by
voting for the public signal when the signals disagreed. Unfortunately, the indifference
level-2 voters face makes it impossible for us to clearly infer their k from the data.
7.3 Cursed equilibrium
Eyster and Rabin (2005) introduced another form of bounded rationality, where players
correctly take into account others’ actions, but fail to update their beliefs using the in-
formation implied in these actions. A single parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] represents “cursedness”,
where χ = 0 characterizes the standard Bayesian equilibrium and χ = 1 characterizes the
“fully cursed” equilibrium, in which agents decide on the best response by taking into
account only the information they have.39
For the symmetric mixed strategies in our voting game, if χ = 0 then the agents play
the equilibrium strategy as described in Proposition 3 and thus vote for the private signal
with probability β∗ when the signals disagree. If χ = 1, the agents play the obedient
equilibrium since they only use their own signals under disagreement and thus from each
agent’s viewpoint the public signal is more likely to be correct.
If χ ∈ (0, 1), each agent’s equilibrium best response is derived based on the belief
that, with probability χ the other agents vote according to the (equilibrium) distribution
of votes regardless of whether their signals agree or disagree; and with probability 1− χ
votes reflect the respective agents’ signals through the equilibrium strategy. Suppose χ
is large. Then if other agents are to mix under disagreement, the posterior of an agent
with signals that disagree would still be in favour of the public signal, since the agent
underestimates the fact that, in order to be pivotal, there have to be a sufficient number
of private signals contradicting the public signal. As a result the agent votes according
to the public signal and obedience is the only symmetric χ-cursed equilibrium strategy
for large enough χ. On the other hand, there would be votes for the private signal
(under disagreement) as χ becomes smaller, while the agents still underrate their private
signal relative to the case where χ = 0. If we allow χ to vary across agents, a potential
interpretation of Table 11 would be that a significant proportion of our subjects had high
degrees of cursedness.
Although it may be possible to postulate a value of χ to fit the data, however, the
cursed equilibrium predicts that for a given χ, voters are more likely to vote for the
private signal in a fifteen-person committee than in a seven-person committee, because
conditional on the same mixing probability when the signals disagree, the weight on the
39The obedient equilibrium is also a χ-cursed equilibrium for any χ ∈ [0, 1], since conditional on the
public signal, there is no further information aggregation through votes (i.e. all agents “pool” by voting
for the public signal). Therefore cursedness does not affect the agents’ posterior.
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Table 12: Random effects probit for 15-person committees: dependent variable = vote
for private signal under disagreement
Independent variable
Treatment 5: Expert info as prior 1.3285*** 1.3132*** 1.5374***
(0.3108) (0.3806) (0.4782)
Treatment 6: q < p 2.7191*** 2.8586*** 3.1288***
(0.3225) (0.3958) (0.4650)
Correct understanding of 0.7785** 1.2594** 1.0068***
information aggregation (0.3317) (0.5599) (0.3595)
Treatment 5 × Correct understanding -0.6409
(0.7712)
Treatment 6 × Correct understanding -0.9284
(0.8437)
Frequency of voting for -1.2137 -0.3755 -0.5061 -0.0668
signals in agreement (1.4127) (1.7617) (1.7577) (1.6571)
No. of periods with disagreement 0.0613* 0.0664 0.0594 -0.0166
(0.0354) (0.0441) (0.0444) (0.0436)
Constant -1.4214 -2.6551 -2.5085 -2.9721
(1.6343) (2.0236) (2.0207) (1.9243)
Session dummies No No No Yes
Observations 4758 3540 3540 3540
Log likelihood -1857.3269 -1286.9689 -1286.3684 -1277.3767
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Treatment 2 (expert) is the base treatment.
Correct understanding = 1 if a subject answers both questions correctly and otherwise 0.
The first model includes observations from the three expert sessions without the questionnaire.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
public signal in the pivotal event is larger in a larger committee and hence the agents
correct for it by voting for the private signal (more often).40 This contradicts our data
on individual voting behaviour under disagreement presented in Tables 2and 11, which
indicate that, by and large, higher proportions of the voters voted for the private signal
in the seven-person committees than in the fifteen-person committees.
8 Appendix C: Supplementary Tables for Section 4.3
8.1 Voting behaviour in the additional treatments with public
information
An alternative approach to the OLS estimates we presented in Table 5 is to take each
vote (under disagreement), rather than each subject, as one observation in a panel and
control for subject heterogeneity. Table 12 presents estimates from random effects probit
40This is also reflected in the equilibrium strategy: Proposition 3 implies β∗(p, q, n′) > β∗(p, q, n) for
any n′ > n and β∗(p, q, n′) > 0. That is, the larger the committee size is, the higher the probability of
voting for the private signal under disagreement.
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Table 13: Majority decisions by 15-person committees
q > p as prior (180 obs.) q < p (180 obs.)
Decision coincided with public signal/bias 0.9222 0.7389
Observed efficiency 0.8056 0.7500
Realized efficiency of prior/public signal (overall) 0.7500 0.5444
Realized efficiency of prior/public signal 0.8012 0.7209
when it coincides with decision
Efficiency if subjects had voted for 0.9056 0.9056
realized private signals
models, and it is immediately clear that the signs of statistically significant coefficients
are the same as those from the OLS.41 However, the random effects models should be
treated with caution, since the dummy for the understanding of information aggregation
may be correlated with unobserved individual characteristics of the subjects.
8.2 Efficiency in the additional treatments with public informa-
tion
The comparison across the treatments with respect to efficiency has proved difficult,
because the signal realizations and especially the accuracies of the public signal varied
across treatments. We were particularly “unlucky” that the realized accuracy of the public
signal in the treatment where it was presented as a prior was rather high (75%, although
on the z-tree code q = 0.70), while we were “lucky” that for the expert treatment the
realized accuracy of the public signal was exactly 70% as intended. As we can see in Table
13, in the treatment with q > p as a prior, when the majority decisions coincided with
public signal the accuracy was even higher, at 80%. Consequently, the efficiency observed
in the treatment was very high, 81%.
One possible adjustment for the treatment with q > p as a prior with respect to the
difference in the accuracies of the public signal is to assume that the accuracy of the
majority decisions was 70% when they coincided with the public signal. The adjusted
efficiency is 71%,42 which is not significant different from the efficiency in the main expert
treatment, although a statistical test based on the adjusted figures would be inappropriate.
The efficiency comparison between the expert treatment and the treatment with q < p
is slightly less problematic but has a similar issue that, contrary to the treatment with
q > p as a prior, the realized public signal was less accurate than it was intended to be
(in the z-tree code q = 0.6 but the realized efficiency of the public signal was 54%). The
observed efficiency is 75%, which lies in between the accuracy of the public signal (54%)
41We cannot use models with subject fixed effects here since there are multiple time-invariant variables
(session dummies, treatment dummies, answer to the questionnaire).
42The decision did not coincide with the public signal in 14 periods, out of which the decision was
correct in 12 periods (86%).
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and what the subjects could have achieved if all of them consistently followed their private
signals (91%).
9 Appendix C: Experimental Instructions43
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the experiment. The purpose of this session is
to study how people make group decisions. The experiment will last approximately 55
minutes. Please switch off your mobile phones. From now until the end of the session, no
communication of any nature with any other participant is allowed. During the experi-
ment we require your complete, undistracted attention. So we ask that you follow these
instructions carefully. If you have any questions at any point, please raise your hand.
The experiment will be conducted through computer terminals. You can earn money in
this experiment. The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions, the decisions
of other participants, and luck. All earnings will be paid to you immediately after the
experiment. During the experiment, your payoff will be calculated in points. After the
experiment, your payoff will be converted into British Pounds (GBP) according to the
following exchange rate: 850 points = £1, and rounded to the nearest pound. Please
remain seated after the experiment. You will be called up one by one according to your
desk number. You will then receive your earnings and will be asked to sign a receipt.
All participants belong to a single group of fifteen until the end of this experiment.
The experiment has two parts and consists of a total of 70 rounds. The first part of
the experiment has10 rounds, and the second part has 60 rounds.
At the beginning of each round, the computer places a prize in one of two virtual boxes:
a blue box and a yellow box. [SHOW PICTURE ON FRONT SCREEN] The location of
the prize for each round is determined by the computer via the toss of a fair coin: at the
beginning of each round it is equally likely that the prize is placed in either box. That is,
the prize is placed in the blue box 50% of the time and the prize is placed in the yellow
box 50% of the time. You will not directly see in which box the prize is hidden, but as
we will describe later you will receive some information about it. [SHOW PICTURE ON
FRONT SCREEN] The box that does not contain the prize remains empty.
The group’s task is to choose a colour. In every round, each group member has two
options, either to vote for BLUE or YELLOW. [SHOW PICTURE ON FRONT SCREEN]
The colour that has received the majority of the votes becomes the group decision for the
round. In every round, each member of the group earns:
1. 100 points if the group decision matches the colour of the box that contains the
prize;
2. 5 points if the group decision does not match the colour of the box that contains
the prize.
43The instructions here are for the treatment for fifteen-person committees, with expert information
and the questionnaire. The instructions for the other treatments are available on request.
37
Note that your payoff for each round is determined exclusively by the group decision. If
the group decision is correct, every group member earns 100 points. If the group decision
is incorrect, every group member earns 5 points. The payoff is independent of how a
particular group member voted.
To summarize, each round proceeds as follows: [SHOW PREVIOUS PICTURES IN
TURN]
1. the computer places a prize in one of two boxes (blue box or yellow box with equal
chance);
2. each group member receives some information about the location of the box;
3. each group member votes for BLUE or YELLOW;
4. group decision is the colour that has received most votes;
5. each group member receives earnings according to the group decision and the actual
location of the prize.
Consider the following example. Suppose you and six other member voted for BLUE
and the eight other members voted for YELLOW. This means that the group decision is
YELLOW.
If the prize was indeed placed in the yellow box, then each group member, including
you, earns 100 points. On the other hand, if the prize was placed in the blue box, each
group member, including you, earns 5 points.
The experiment is divided into two parts. Both parts follow what we have described
so far, but they are different in terms of i) the information each group member receives
before voting, and ii) the number of rounds.
Part 1
The first part of the experiment will take place over 10 rounds. In each round, after the
prize is placed in one of the two boxes but before group members vote, each participant
receives a single piece of information about the location of the prize. We will call this type
of information Private Information. Private Information will be generated independently
and revealed to each participant separately, and it can be different for different group
members. No other participants of the experiment will see your Private Information.
[SHOW SCREEN FOR DECISION]
Private Information is not 100% reliable in predicting the box containing the prize.
Reliability refers to how often Private Information gives the correct colour of the box.
Specifically, Private Information gives each of you the colour of the box with the prize
65% of the time, and the colour of the empty box 35% of the time.
The reliability of Private Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer rolls a
fair 20-sided dice for each group member. A real 20-sided dice is on your desk to help
your understanding.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 13 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 or 13), then that
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member’s Private Information is the colour of the box with the prize. Note that 13 out
of 20 times means 65%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 14 to 20 (14,15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then that
member’s Private Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 7 out of 20 times
means 35%.
Private Information is more likely to be correct than incorrect. Also, all group members
receive equally reliable Private Information. However, since it is generated independently
for each member, members in the same group do not necessarily get the same informa-
tion. It is possible that your Private Information is BLUE while other members’ Private
Information is YELLOW.
Finally, at the end of each round, you will see the number of votes for BLUE, the
number of votes for YELLOW, and whether the group decision matched the colour of the
box with the prize.
Part 1 will start after a short quiz to check your understanding of the instructions.
[PART 1 COMMENCES]
Part 2
The second part of the experiment will take place over 60 rounds. In each round,
after the prize is placed in one of the two boxes but before group members vote, each
group member receives two pieces of information, namely Private Information and Public
Information, about the location of the prize. [SHOW SCREEN FOR DECISION] As
before, in each round Private Information will be generated independently and revealed
to each group member separately, and no other participants of the experiment will see
your Private Information. It gives each of you the colour of the box with the prize 65%
of the time, and the colour of the empty box 35% of the time.
The reliability of Private Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer rolls a
fair 20-sided dice for each group member.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 13 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 or 13), then that
member’s Private Information is the colour of the box with the prize. Note that 13 out
of 20 times means 65%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 14 to 20 (14,15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then Private
Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 7 out of 20 times means 35%.
In addition to but independently of Private Information, Public Information is revealed
to all members of your group. In each round all group members get the same Public
Information. It gives you the colour of the box with the prize 70% of the time, and the
colour of the empty box 30% of the time.
The reliability of Public Information can be described as follows:
1. In each round, after the prize is placed in one of the boxes, the computer rolls a
fair 20-sided dice (one dice roll for all members of your group), separately from the dice
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rolls for Private Information.
2.
a. If the result of the dice roll is 1 to 14 (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 or 14), then
your group’s Public Information is the colour of the box with the prize. Note that 14 out
of 20 times means 70%.
b. If the result of the dice roll is 15 to 20 (15,16,17,18,19 or 20), then your group’s
Public Information is the colour of the empty box. Note that 6 out of 20 times means
30%.
Neither Public Information nor Private Information is 100% reliable in predicting the
box with the prize, but both pieces of information are more likely to be correct than
incorrect.
Note that those two pieces of information may not give you the same colour (it may
be that one says BLUE and the other says YELLOW), in which case only one of them
is correct. Public Information is more likely to be correct than each member’s Private
Information. However, it could be that your Private Information is correct and the Public
Information is incorrect. Also, even if both pieces of information give you the same colour,
it may not match the colour of the box that contains the prize, since neither is 100%
reliable.
At the end of each round, you will see the number of votes for BLUE, the number of
votes for YELLOW, and whether the group decision matches the colour of the box with
the prize.
Part 2 will start after a short quiz to check your understanding of the instructions.
[PART 2 COMMENCES]
Part 3
Now you will have the last two rounds of this experiment. You will make two choices
for each round. The points you may earn for each choice are tripled compared to the
points for each round in the previous two parts of the experiment, so please pay full
attention. In the next two rounds, the computer, not the members of the group, casts all
votes on your behalf. However, you choose how the computer votes before the computer
generates any information about the location of the prize.
In Round 71, your first choice is between the following two options:
Option A: The computer votes according to the Private Information of all members.
For example, if 6 members receive BLUE and 9 members receive YELLOW, the computer
casts 6 votes for BLUE and 9 votes for YELLOW, and thus the decision will be YELLOW.
Note that each member’s Private Information is correct 65% of the time.
Option B: The computer votes according to Public Information only. That is, if the
Public Information is BLUE, there will be 15 votes for BLUE and thus the decision will
be BLUE. Note that the Public Information is correct 70% of the time.
The points you earn depends on the majority decision that follows from your own
choice between the two options. That is, the participants who choose Option A will all
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earn the same points, and the participants who choose Option B will all earn the same
points. If the majority decision matches the colour of the box with the prize, you earn
300 points, and 15 points otherwise.
After you have made the choice above, you will be asked to guess, including yourself,
which of the two options has been chosen by more members (i.e. 8 or more members of
the group).
If your guess is correct, you will earn 300 points. If your guess is incorrect, you earn
15 points.
You will see the results (the votes, location of the prize, points earned, whether your
guess is correct, etc.) at the end of the experiment. [ROUND 71 (FIRST QUESTION)
COMMENCES]
The next and the final round of the experiment, Round 72, is the same as Round 71,
except that Public Information is correct 60% of the time. Your choice is between the
following two options:
Option A: The computer votes according to the Private Information of all members.
For example, if 6 members receive BLUE and 9 members receive YELLOW, the computer
casts 6 votes for BLUE and 9 votes for YELLOW, and thus the decision will be YELLOW.
Note that each member’s Private Information is correct 65% of the time.
Option B: The computer votes according to Public Information only. That is, if the
Public Information is BLUE, there will be 15 votes for BLUE and thus the decision will
be BLUE. Note that the Public Information is correct 60% of the time.
If the majority decision that follows from your choice matches the colour of the box
with the prize, you earn 300 points, and 15 points otherwise.
After you have made the choice between the two options, you will be asked to guess,
including yourself, which of the two options has been chosen by more members (i.e. 8 or
more members of the group). If your guess is correct, you earn 300 points. If your guess
is incorrect, you earn 15 points. [ROUND 72 (SECOND QUESTION) COMMENCES]
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